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in the Daily Lives of North Koreans during the 
Korean War
Taewoo Kim
This article analyzes the overturning of time and space in the daily lives of North 
Koreans during the Korean War. The overturning was caused by the aerial bombings 
by the United States Air Force that lasted for three years. In particular, after the 
execution of the scorched earth policy, in November 1950, which destroyed all the 
cities and villages in North Korea, most people lost their dwellings and had to endure 
living underground, in dugouts or mud-huts; they were also mobilized at night to 
restore industries and transportation facilities. This article describes the miserable 
daily lives of North Korean civilians during the war, a topic that has rarely been 
discussed, and explains how this experience continues to affect the worldview of the 
North Korean people. 
Keywords Korean War, North Korea, daily life, USAF, bombing, wartime  
                         restoration
Introduction
The Korean War lasted for three years (1950‒1953) and completely overturned 
the daily lives of the Korean people. It was all too obvious to Koreans in both 
South and North that they could not live the ordinary lives that they had enjoyed 
before the war. All social goals and activities were reoriented for the attainment 
of the national goal—winning the war. Individuals were forced to sacrifice 
themselves for their country in national wartime mobilization. 
However, the daily lives of South Koreans, who were located primarily in the 
rear area during the war, were relatively calm and peaceful compared to the lives 
of North Koreans.1 In particular, after the front was stabilized near the present 
Military Demarcation Line in the middle of 1951 and armistice negotiations 
began in earnest, most parts of South Korea—except the front and a few isolated 
guerrilla areas—were quite free from the destruction of the war. During this 
Asian Journal of Peacebuilding  Vol. 2  No. 2 (2014): 241-262
doi: 10.18588/201411.000030 Research Article 
© 2014 The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University
ISSN 2288-2693 Print, ISSN 2288-2707 Online
242 Taewoo Kim
time North Koreans experienced completely different daily lives. In North Korea, 
from immediately after the outbreak of the war to the finalization of the armistice 
negotiations, there was no actual rear area. Throughout the war that dragged on 
throughout the long armistice negotiations the most important goal for ordinary 
North Koreans was only survival. 
Aerial bombing in North Korea by the United States Air Force (USAF) 
was the most crucial cause of the difference in everyday life between North and 
South Koreans. The United States had directly intervened immediately after the 
outbreak of the war, on June 25, 1950, and started air strikes in North Korea 
with the bombing of the airfield near Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, 
on June 29. The United States continued bombing North Korea every day for 
three years, until the armistice agreement came into effect at 10 p.m. on July 27, 
1953. During the early months of the war the USAF tried to follow a policy of 
precision strategic bombing targeting only military targets. However, most of the 
military targets in the earlier part of the war were located in densely populated 
urban areas, and the accuracy rate of the U.S. strategic bombers was noticeably 
low, so that adhering to the precision bombing policy was practically impossible. 
Furthermore, Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations Forces Commander, 
officially initiated, on November 5, 1950, the destructive “scorched earth policy,” 
which designated all the cities and villages in North Korea as military targets of 
the USAF bombers. This decision was made as the UN ground forces were forced 
to give up territory in the face of assaults by the newly appeared enemy, the 
Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA). Until the end of the war, even wholly 
civilian areas in North Korea were regarded as justifiable military targets that 
could be destroyed at any time, and all of the cities in the North were reduced to 
rubble (T. Kim 2012b).
The daily lives of North Koreans living among the ruins were never the 
same following the outbreak of the war. Aerial bombing caused the destruction 
of the basic necessities of life. It also made North Koreans conscious of the crisis 
state of their everyday lives, as they had to find a way to survive in the face of 
indiscriminate air strikes by the USAF. The North Korean government diligently 
established relief policies for war refugees, but the destruction was so widespread 
that there was a clear limit to what could be done.
This article explores the daily lives of North Koreans during the Korean War, 
a topic that has rarely been discussed in the literature. Surprisingly enough, it 
is hard to find previous studies specifically analyzing this issue. Recently, Han’s 
research paid attention to the process of forming the concept of inmin (the 
people)2 as a unique identity of North Koreans forged through the Korean War, 
but surprisingly his study did not include examination of the everyday lives of 
North Koreans during the war (Han 2012a; 2012b). Perhaps the lack of socio-
historical data documenting the wartime daily lives of North Koreans is the most 
important reason for the absence of such a research focus in previous studies. 
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Furthermore, we need to pay attention to the fact that the view regarding North 
Koreans as victims of the war has been strictly forbidden in South Korea due 
to the deep antagonism between North and South following the war. Given 
the antagonistic cold-war relationship, North Korea had to be viewed as the 
“aggressor” at all times. In this political and social atmosphere, it has not been an 
easy task to perform an objective analysis of the daily lives of North Koreans or 
an analysis viewing them as victims. 
This study aims to analyze the phenomenon of the overturning of the daily 
lives of North Koreans due to air strikes by the USAF by comparing North Korean 
army documents captured by the U.S. Army in occupied territory, intelligence 
reports by the USAF, and documents from the Soviet Union and China. Aerial 
bombings during the war led to differentiation in the lives of South Koreans and 
North Koreans. Bombings had a deep effect on the time, space, and thought 
of North Koreans and radically overturned their daily lives. Furthermore, the 
overturning of the daily lives of North Koreans during the Korean War still has a 
major impact on the daily lives and thinking of contemporary North Koreans.
Overturned Space: Underground Living
The outbreak of a war naturally causes huge shock and fear for civilians caught in 
a battlefield. Many civilians, uprooted from their long-time living arrangement, 
flee for survival to avoid the flames of war. Distortion and desertion from one’s 
daily living space during wartime is not unusual. The distortion of the space of 
daily life was not limited to South Korea, where the South Korean and North 
Korean armies violently collided in the early months of the war. During the same 
period, the evacuation of civilians likewise occurred in North Korea, though the 
cities and villages were far from the early battlefields in the South.
Before the outbreak of the Korean War, the North Korean leadership 
evaluated the probability of U.S. participation in the war to be low. Kim Il Sung, 
the North Korean leader, and his entourage stayed in Moscow for a month in 
April 1950 and met with Stalin three times before the outbreak of the war. Kim 
contended that the United States was not foolish enough to intervene because 
North Korea had forged an alliance with the Soviet Union and China (Torkunov 
2003, 112-113). Kim Il Sung seemed sure that the United States would not directly 
intervene in the Korean Peninsula because the U.S. had not dispatched an army 
to China during the Chinese Civil War (1946‒1949). This poor evaluation by the 
North Korean leadership of the possibility of U.S. intervention was confirmed 
by the lack of an air-defence policy in the North right after the outbreak of the 
war. Once the USAF started bombing North Korea, Kim Il Sung and other North 
Korean leaders—including Kim Du Bong, Kim Dal Hyun, and Pak Hon Yong—
were shocked and flustered (Shtykov 1950). Government officials, members 
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of the Korean Workers Party (KWP), and a lot of civilians in cities lost their 
sense of judgment, were confused, and were left without practical and concrete 
alternatives.
When bombings began the first phenomenon was the disorganized 
dispersion and evacuation of the urban population. For example, dozens of 
governmental institutions and members of social organizations in Wonsan, one 
of the major industrial cities on the east coast of North Korea, continually urged 
citizens to disperse. In addition, party officials in Nampo, an industrial city on 
the west coast, officially decided upon and issued orders for the evacuation of 
citizens. Some of the party officials in Nampo deserted their posts in advance, 
relinquishing their responsibilities, and some staff members of Home Affairs 
(Naemuseo) in Wonsan even threatened and banished citizens who had sought 
shelter in the designated safe zone. They neglected wartime responsibilities of 
extinguishing fires and transporting staple supplies. In addition, the production 
rate and worker attendance rate of major industrial facilities dramatically 
decreased; for example, the attendance rate of the Wonsan car factory was 11.5% 
and the rate of the Nampo smelter was only 21%. Most of the citizens of Wonsan 
and Nampo chaotically escaped to the countryside, and they ate and slept in the 
open to avoid the air strikes (KWP 1950). The first spatial distortion occurring 
immediately after the outbreak of the war was “desertion” from the past ordinary 
space.
Desertion from their daily life space could temporarily protect civilians’ 
lives. But civilians could not continue camping in the mountains and the 
outskirts of the cities throughout the war that, as far as anyone knew, could last 
anywhere from several months to several years. In particular, a temporary shelter 
with a simple awning but lacking a firm residential space might be feasible in the 
summer (June‒August), but simple camping could not be enough to protect the 
evacuees with the change of season and the onset of the harsh Korean winter. 
Furthermore, after setting all the cities and farm villages in North Korea as 
military targets in November 1950, the USAF started to burn even individual 
private houses in the deep mountains using incendiary bombs, which had 
shown their destructive power in World War II. As a result, North Koreans were 
suddenly and completely exposed to bitter cold—from 20 to 30 degrees below 
zero centigrade. The North Korean leadership had to solve the housing problems 
threatening the survival of the civilian population.
The solution for the housing problem suggested by the North Korean 
leadership in November 1950 was the construction of “dugouts” or “mud-huts.” 
Dugouts or mud-huts meant temporary dwellings that could provide protection 
from the cold or storms constructed by digging an underground tunnel and 
covering it up with straw matting or dirt. The North Korean leadership, in fact, 
commanded the people to dig into the ground under the ruined cities and live 
in underground tunnels to survive the bitter cold and bombing. They instructed 
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the civilians to “build dugouts or mud-huts in a proper place by late November,” 
but a concrete measure for actualization of the plan suggested by the government 
merely mentioned the following: “Take action to guarantee the supply of 
materials such as wood needed for building dugouts or mud-huts” (DPRK 1950).
The underground living conditions of civilians in North Korea from late 
1950 to early 1951, when the scorched earth policy was executed by the USAF, 
was clearly shown in the report of the investigation team of the Women’s 
International Democratic Federation (WIDF).3 The investigation team, called 
the Women’s International Commission for the Investigation of War Atrocities 
Committed in Korea (WICIWAK), conducted an on-site survey at the time of 
the war and made a vivid record of conditions and war damage. The investigation 
team sent to North Korea during the war was composed of 20 representatives 
from 18 countries in Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa, plus one observer. 
The team leader was Nora Rodd, a Canadian. Between May 16 and 27, 1951, the 
team visited several cities and villages, including Pyongyang, Sinuiju, Nampo, 
Wonsan and Haeju (WICIWAK 1951, 5).
The city that the investigation team first visited was Sinuiju, located in the 
border area between North Korea and China in the northwestern region of the 
Korean Peninsula. The team described the lives of the citizens of Sinuiju, a city 
destroyed by bombing, as follows:
The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants live in dug-outs made of earth 
supported with salvaged timber. Some of these dug-outs have roofs made of tiles and 
timber, salvaged from destroyed buildings. Others are living in cellars that remained 
after the bombardment and still others in thatched tents with the frame-work of 
destroyed buildings and in huts made of unmortared brick and rubble (ibid., 9-10).
The USAF scorched-earth policy brought devastation to a considerable portion of 
the civilian areas in North Korea. “The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants” 
in Sinuiju could only carry on with life while living in battered mud-huts. The 
investigation group visited one hut in person, that of Kwon Mun Su and his 
family. Kwon Mun Su lived with his wife and three children in a small hut divided 
into two rooms. One room was a kitchen measuring one-half by three meters, 
and the other room was a bedroom measuring three by two meters. Five family 
members lived in this small room measuring only six square meters. From the 
point of view of the investigation team members, daily life in that place was 
terrible. However, Kwon and his family were considered “lucky” and they were 
the envy of their neighbors. This was because they at least had a room to stay in 
and also one blanket, amenities that most other people did not have (ibid., 10).
As mentioned above, in November 1950, the North Korean government 
commanded citizens who had completely lost their residential space due to the 
USAF scorched earth bombing to build underground huts, such as those shown 
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in Figure 1, for protection from air strikes and the cold. North Koreans were 
obliged to construct huts for survival because throughout the country it was 
practically impossible to engage in daily life while living in a house aboveground. 
However, as shown in Figure 1, huts might have been able to protect the lives of 
the inhabitants from cold in the middle of winter, but they could hardly protect 
them from air strikes. General-purpose and incendiary bombs dropped by the 
USAF could easily destroy and burn such roughly built houses.
The WIDF investigation team conducted interviews with the inhabitants 
of Pyongyang. The team, which was divided into four groups to inspect each 
downtown area, could not find any houses having walls or ceilings during their 
inspection. They visited several families, including the family of Kang Bok Sen. 
This family consisted of five members including a three-year-old child and an 
eight-month-old infant. They were living in the air-raid shelter of the destroyed 
Women’s Federation office building, in a space that measured just one by two 
meters. Furthermore, the investigation team members had to crawl through a 
three-meter tunnel to enter the shelter. This small space was their sole living 
space. It was miraculous that five people, including two small children, were able 
to live in a small underground room measuring only two square meters. 
Figure 2 vividly shows the weary daily lives of North Koreans living in 
Figure 1. Woman and Child in the Entrance of a Mud-hut
Source: Springer 2009, 31.
Overturned Time and Space 247
dugout shelters. Such a small dugout that a person could not move freely within 
was not a temporary shelter but a main living space. According to the WIDF 
research group, “The earth walls are too low to enable an adult to stand upright.” 
In addition, “this shelter was typical rather than exceptional, and it would be 
possible to quote many more instances of families living in similar conditions” 
(WICIWAK 1951, 16).
The research team members lastly visited Kanggye and could see that “as 
in the other ruined cities, inhabitants live in holes in the ground.” One family 
that the research group members visited in person was living in a basement of a 
destroyed building, and a 13-year-old child was taking care of his little brothers 
and sisters in the darkness. The youngest one was two years old. Their father, a 
railroad laborer, had been killed during a bombing of Kanggye by USAF planes 
on October 7 (ibid., 44-45). In this way, the war and bombings were threatening 
children’s lives and rendering their daily lives completely unstable.
It can also be confirmed from North Korean investigation reports and 
newspaper articles that underground air-raid shelters in cities, and huts and 
holes at the foot of mountains were major living spaces until the end of the 
war. For example, the inhabitants in the residence zone in Pyongyang called 
Podowon (vineyard) were all living in huts, but the inhabitants as well as the 
Figure 2. Family in a Dugout Shelter
Source: Russian State Film and Photo Archive.
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huts disappeared after bombings on July 11, 1952 (Rodong Sinmun 1952a). 
The inhabitants “mostly living in the huts in the ruined” west and north zones 
in Pyongyang were also affected “with the destruction and disappearance 
of many houses and huts” due to the mass bombing on August 20 (Rodong 
Sinmun 1952b). In Wonsan, on September 17, 1952, “a great number of huts” 
were destroyed due to air strikes and bombardment from a warship (Rodong 
Sinmun 1952d). In Chongjin, on November 17, 1952, many huts were destroyed 
due to “approximately 190 bombings of hut zones in the city and farm areas.” 
In Kanggye, on November 19, “dispersed civilian huts” in the target area were 
destroyed by approximately 90 bombing and strafing attacks (Rodong Sinmun 
1952e). At that time, Rodong Sinmun, an official organ of the Korean Workers 
Party, denounced the USAF for air strikes continuing night and day “with the aim 
of destroying the few huts and inhabitants remaining in the ruined city” (Rodong 
Sinmun 1952c).
Beginning in July 1952, the number of North Korean newspaper articles 
related to the destruction of civilian hut areas greatly increased, and this was not 
coincidental. It directly reflected the development of the “air pressure strategy” by 
the U.S. Air Force that was launched in the same month. The United States aimed 
to increase pressure on the North Korean side at the armistice negotiations that 
were taking place at that time. The negotiations were deadlocked over the issue 
of prisoner exchange and the United States sought to break the deadlock by the 
overwhelming use of air power and bombing of civilian areas in North Korea. 
The key leaders of the U.S. Air Force who planned this strategy contended that 
buildings and inhabitants in the villages and the cities should be major targets. 
According to their report, “Killing considerable number of them [rear area troops 
and civilian laborers] would hurt the enemy, even though his manpower supply 
is vast ... These [buildings in cities and villages] should be considered as targets 
since they frequently provide concealment for supplies and shelter for troops and 
laborers” (Randolph and Mayo 1952, 12-13).
In planning the air pressure strategy in 1952, the United States paid 
particular attention to North Korean hydroelectric power plants as priority 
targets in order to exert psychological pressure on the North Korean leadership 
and people. The hydroelectric power plants in Supung, Pujon, Changjin, Hochon, 
Puyong and Mt. Kumgang were top-class facilities built by Japanese technical 
experts over a period of more than 20 years during the Japanese colonial period. 
These plants generated more than 90% of North Korea’s electric power. In 
addition, the Supung power plant provided more than 10% of the power supply 
in Northeast China. 
During the early part of the war the UN forces had excluded hydroelectric 
power plants from the list of strategic targets in North Korea. Military, economic, 
and political factors complexly affected the setting of this principle. First, the 
hydroelectric power plants were not production facilities, which were the key 
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strategic targets. And they were not easy to destroy completely because they were 
dispersed around the country. Furthermore, in the early months of the war, from 
the point of view of the UN forces that assumed the possibility of UN occupation 
of North Korea, electric power was critically important for recovery after the war, 
and the reconstruction of power plants would be costly. Furthermore, the Supung 
power plant supplied a considerable portion of electric power to Manchuria, 
and the UN forces did not want to provoke China during the early part of the 
war. However, when establishing the air pressure strategy in 1952, key leaders of 
the U.S. Air Force suddenly contended that the hydroelectric power plants were 
the most valuable targets in North Korea and the attack ban should be cancelled 
immediately (Randolph and Mayo 1952, 15).
The reason that the U.S. Air Force contended that the destruction of the 
hydroelectric power plants was the most effective way to psychologically suppress 
North Korea was directly related to North Koreans’ underground living. USAF 
intelligence reports suggested that industrial facilities in North Korea were being 
reconstructed in underground facilities dispersed around the country. As shown 
in Figure 3, North Korea built major industrial facilities underground to avoid 
air strikes and continue production of supplies and weapons required for the war. 
Major social and political activities were also performed in the large underground 
tunnels. The USAF eventually realized that it was impossible to completely 
destroy these underground industrial facilities and that the destruction of 
the power source was more effective for military operations compared to the 
destruction of the industrial facilities. North Korean manufacturing facilities 
would be useless without electric power. The USAF actually started the bombing 
of the Supung power plant on June 23, 1952, and continued to attack the major 
hydroelectric power plants in North Korea for several months thereafter (Stewart 
1957, 119-136).
Figure 3. Wartime Underground Industrial Facilities (left), Wartime Underground Meeting of 
Members of the Korean Workers Party (right)
Source: National Archives of Korea.
250 Taewoo Kim
In this way, the three-year USAF bombing campaign during the Korean 
War displaced ordinary people in North Korea from their daily spaces. As a 
result, they moved from aboveground homes to underground dwellings, and 
major political and economic activities of North Korea were performed only in 
underground spaces. A considerable number of the inhabitants had to spend 
most of their time in small, dark huts. The only purpose there was survival. Can 
we guess the thoughts of the 13-year-old boy who had to take care of his sisters 
and brothers, including a two-year-old baby, in the small and dirty basement? 
How well can we understand North Korean civilians’ hostility toward the United 
States, who had caused the deaths of their family members and the destruction 
of their mud huts in their already heavily ruined cities? War always makes a 
civilian’s daily life in the rear areas of the front very tragic. But North Koreans had 
to endure even more horrible daily lives due to USAF air strikes during the three 
years of the Korean War. 
Overturned Time: Wartime Restoration Activities
The overturning of the daily lives of North Koreans due to the bombings during 
the Korean War was also shown remarkably in the aspect of time, because the 
bombings completely reversed daytime and nighttime for a considerable number 
of people. It was not only the small underground tunnels that protected North 
Koreans from air strikes during the war but also the pitch-black darkness of the 
night that enabled civilians to work aboveground.
The overturning of many North Koreans’ days and nights, induced by the 
bombings, started with the North Korean troops at the front during the early 
part of the war. In July 1950, as the tactical air operations of the USAF fighter-
bombers in South Korea dramatically increased, the military operations of the 
North Korean troops began to change drastically. In the early days of the war, 
the North Korean troops had continued to advance south, with direct attacks 
on the defensive positions of the South Korean armed forces. However, once the 
operations of the USAF in South Korea intensified, the North Korean troops 
started to use flank attacks, using roundabout ways and mountain road detours to 
besiege and isolate the resistance points of the South Koreans. In addition, many 
North Korean units moved only during the night in order to avoid daily tactical 
air strikes. All types of transportation for unit support were mobilized mainly 
during the night, and daytime maneuvers were undertaken only when rain or 
other inclement weather made bombing impossible (KIMH 2001, 194).
The U.S. Fifth Air Force’s operational analysis team investigated the 
countermeasures used by North Korean troops in the face of USAF fighter-
bombers by interviewing North Korean troops captured in South Korea in 1950. 
Nine out of a total of 37 troops investigated (approximately one-fourth) testified 
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that their units “travelled only at night” (FAF Operations Analysis Office 1951a). 
In August 1950, Pak Hyo Sam, the 9th infantry division commander of the North 
Korean troops, issued a “march-order” (haenggun myeonryeong) that told “troops 
to march mainly at night following a hard schedule after resting in the daytime” 
(Staff of the 315th Military Unit, 1950). U.S. air strikes during the early part of the 
war reversed the active hours from daytime to nighttime for the North Korean 
troops and also changed the pattern of ground battles.
During the same period of time, some North Koreans supporting the war 
effort behind the lines were also living with reversed days and nights. They were 
personnel participating in the reconstruction of industrial and transportation 
facilities destroyed by air strikes. Initially these people, temporarily assigned 
to reconstruction activities, worked around the clock rather than living with 
reversed days and nights. For example, in August 1950, laborers for electric power 
distribution, under the command of manager Jang Hong Nam, succeeded in 
restoring in a short period of time transmission lines and a substation destroyed 
by the bombing. They received essential assistance from a noryeok hyeopjodae 
(labor supply group), which was composed of approximately 3,000 farmers from 
nearby areas. They were engaged in restoration regardless of whether it was day 
or night; thus, transformer repairs, which usually took more than a month, were 
completed in just six days (Rodong Sinmun 1950b).
In this way, reconstruction activities in response to damage caused by 
wartime bombing focusing on major munitions and industrial facilities in North 
Korea during the early part of the war were sharply expanded after the middle 
of 1951 to include railroads, roads, and bridges throughout the country. The 
reason for this nationwide, major expansion of wartime restoration activities was 
directly related to the railroad interdiction campaign by the USAF, which began 
in the middle of 1951 and continued for a year. Studies on the history of USAF 
operations usually highlight this period of one year (June 1951-June 1952) after 
the beginning of armistice negotiations as the period of railroad interdiction 
(Futrell 1961, 400-438; Kohn and Harahan 1986; Mark 1994). During this period 
railroads in North Korea were some of the most important USAF targets. The 
communist forces (North Korean and Chinese) fighting at the front absolutely 
depended on food and weapons from China. If food and weapons were not 
supplied to the front, the communist forces would collapse immediately. In this 
situation, the rail system was regarded as one of the most important means of 
transportation for providing supplies.
Studies show that in North Korea today rail transportation accounts for 
90% of total cargo transportation, while road transportation and maritime 
transportation account for only 7% and 3%, respectively. In the case of passenger 
transportation, rail accounts for 62%, and road transportation and maritime 
transportation account for 37% and 1%, respectively (Suh 2008, 437). The origins 
of this absolute dependency on railroads for cargo and passenger transportation 
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in North Korea can be traced to the extensive railroad investment policies of 
Japan during the colonial period. 
In the 1930s, the Japanese Empire adopted the policy of using the northern 
part of the Korean Peninsula as a supply base, and rapidly implemented an 
extensive program of railroad construction in order to efficiently requisition 
the human and material resources of Korea. Japan planned comprehensive 
railroad construction for logistics and exploitation according to the Chosen 
Railway 12-year Plan (1927‒1938). The construction of a large number of 
railroad lines in northern Korea was initiated according to this plan, such as the 
Domun line (Unggi-Donggwangjin, completed 1933), Hyesan line (Seongjin-
Hyesan, completed 1937), Manpo line (Suncheon-Manpojin, completed 1939), 
Donghae line (Wonsan-Pohang, Ulsan-Busan, partially completed by 1940), and 
Pyeongwon line (Pyongyang-Kowon, completed 1941). The Japanese Empire 
constructed port-oriented as well as north-south railroad lines, considering 
military advantages (Park 2008, 298-301). As it turned out, these features could 
be effectively used not only by the Japanese army during the colonial period but 
also by North Korean forces during the Korean War.
In the early part of the war Kim Il Sung ordered the organization of the 
“wartime railroad restoration regiment” in response to the railroad interdiction 
strategy of the USAF. Kim consistently stressed the importance of railroad 
restoration: “We should make a rational wartime transportation organization 
and rapidly improve railroad transportation facilities, including locomotives and 
freight trains, in order to increase their availability…. Railroad laborers should 
exhibit the ability to guarantee transportation to the front and actively learn train 
operation methods suitable for wartime conditions to ensure the mobility of 
transportation” (I.S. Kim 1980a, 98).
Emphasis on railroad transportation by the North Korean leadership gave 
birth to many heroes from the early part of the war. For example, the standing 
committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea issued a government 
ordinance to award the National Flag 3rd Class, at that time the highest honor that 
could be awarded to labors, and the Meritorious Deed Medal to 29 laborers who 
had been deemed to have made a great contribution to wartime transportation. 
In related newspaper articles North Korea emphasized the dedication of Ri Byong 
Son, a railroad laborer, and Kim Gun Su, a communications officer, in restoring 
railroad lines. Another article extolled the life-and-death train operation of Kang 
In Sop, an engineer, as a brilliant, heroic tale (Rodong Sinmun 1950a). As wartime 
train transportation began to emerge as a vital issue impacting the outcome of 
the war, the North Korean leadership consistently emphasized the dedication of 
laborers working in this sector.
On August 17, 1950, the North Korean Ministry of Industry issued an 
instruction, “Concerning Guarantee of Wartime Rail Freight Transport,” to 
every enterprise officially designating items regarded as military supplies, and 
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took urgent steps to forbid rail transportation for non-military goods. This list 
of military supplies included the raw materials and equipment of each business 
such as iron ore, anthracite, steel, and hardwood. “Not urgent or not important 
cargoes” were designated as subject to prohibition for train transport (Jung 1950).
An important factor behind this emphasis on train transportation was the 
relatively superior freightage capability of train transport as well as the extensive 
railroad network in North Korea. According to previous studies, the railroad 
capacity was 16.3 million tons and the cargo capacity was 3,405 million ton-
kilometers (tons of railroad cargo by the transport distance) in 1949. By another 
measure, the railroad transport capacity of North Korea right before the Korean 
War was 44,657 tons per day (Suh 2008, 442).
According to an intelligence report of the Eighth United States Army during 
the war, the North Korean troops and the Chinese military forces had 60 divisions 
of various types in the combat areas in Sariwon and southward, and each division 
required 40 tons of supplies daily. In other words, the North Korean and Chinese 
military forces required 2,400 tons of supplies every day. The loading capacity 
of one train car was 20 tons, whereas the loading capacity of one truck was 
only two tons. Therefore, 120 freight train cars could transport the daily supply 
requirement (FAF G-2 Eighth Army and A-2 1951). Considering the fact that the 
daily transported load of the North Korean railroad system exceeded 40,000 tons 
per day in 1949, supplies for troops in the front could be covered entirely by train 
transportation if rapid restoration was accomplished during the war. Therefore, 
the UN forces had no choice but to focus on the destruction of the North Korean 
railroad system since it directly affected the outcome of battles.
The USAF’s Operation Strangle, lasting from August to December 1951, and 
Operation Saturate, lasting from March to May 1952, were typical examples of the 
U.S. railroad interdiction campaign during this period. For these operations the 
USAF developed new bombing techniques specifically for railroad interdiction 
(FAF Operations Analysis Office 1951b; FAF Deputy for Intelligence 1952b, 45-
48). Nevertheless, in the end the USAF had to admit the failure of its railroad 
interdiction campaign. The cutting-edge technology of the most powerful 
country in the world had succumbed to the manpower of one of Asia’s newborn 
agricultural countries.
The North Korean leadership made a life-and-death bet during the war on 
railroad and bridge reconstruction. Kim Il Sung said: “If railroads and roads are 
destroyed due to bombings by enemy planes, we should mobilize the people to 
restore the railroads and roads in timely fashion for the prudential transportation 
of military supplies and rear supplies” (I.S. Kim 1980b, 22). Thus the North 
Korean leadership aggressively mobilized the population to overcome the USAF’s 
railroad interdiction campaign.
Figure 4 illustrates railroad interdiction bombing by the USAF in 1951 
as well as the critical but dangerous railroad restoration program of the North 
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Koreans. The photo was taken northwest of Pyongyang on April 7, 1951, and 
it shows the moment right before a parabomb drops onto the railroad. At least 
five people around the railroad are lying face down to avoid bomb shrapnel. The 
woman closest to the falling bomb is hiding in a bomb crater formed previously. 
The photo indicates that railroad restoration by North Koreans was actually a life-
and-death battle rather than ordinary forced labor (FEAF 1951).
The North Korean government needed to find a way to protect the lives 
of inhabitants near railroad lines, which were relatively densely populated 
Figure 4. Railroad Interdiction by USAF showing North Korean Laborers, 1951. 
Source: FEAF1951.
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areas throughout North Korea, and to mobilize them on a regular basis to the 
restoration projects. The optimal measure the government found was nighttime 
railroad restoration. Figure 4 shows the laborers accidently exposed in the 
daytime, but railroad restoration was mostly carried out at night. Those involved 
in railroad restoration projects fared no better than those engaged in actual 
battle against the bombing and darkness of the night. A USAF intelligence report 
describes the pattern of railroad restoration by North Korean laborers: 
The enemy continued to demonstrate vast manpower resources in repair activities.... 
Intelligence sources have established, quite accurately, that major repair activities 
begin at dusk, and that from six to eight hours are usually required to repair a rail 
cut. Since it is also known that all repair activity is conducted simultaneously, it can 
be concluded that, on the average, a rail line can be used at most from midnight to 
sunrise. For example, between Sinanju and Pyongyang the enemy employs track-
walkers to spot rail cuts and to recruit citizenry labor to fill the bomb craters as soon 
as possible after a strike. With nightfall, experienced military repair crews, with 
materials and equipment, begin the actual repair of ties and rails (FAF Deputy for 
Intelligence 1952a, 22-23).
The communist side could make progress on railroad restoration and transportation 
only at night because of the daytime bombings. The USAF intelligence report 
suggests that restoration personnel belonging to the North Korean and Chinese 
military forces, as well as numerous civilian laborers, were continuously 
mobilized for restoration projects, and there were observers at major railroad 
sections who could quickly locate breaks in the line. This fact was also confirmed 
by official North Korean and Chinese documents.
The North Korean and Chinese leadership mobilized large numbers of 
laborers for railroad and train repairs in order to guarantee the transport of 
supplies that could make or break the war effort. In particular, the Chinese 
forces conducting military operations in North Korea, where supplies were 
totally insufficient, had to replenish supplies and equipment almost completely 
by transport from China. Furthermore, the bombings destroyed major roads 
and bridges on a large scale so that railroads were critically important once the 
Chinese military forces entered the war.
On November 6, 1950, the Chinese military forces formed the Logistical 
Support Unit composed of railroad laborers and began to conduct railroad-
related operations in earnest. In addition, for the effective management of 
the railroads, China and North Korea rapidly established a unified railroad 
management system between the two countries. The basic terms of the agreement 
between the two countries were determined during a Beijing visit by Kim Il 
Sung in December 1950. The final outcome of the agreement was specified in 
“Consultation on the Wartime Military Management System for North Korean 
Railroads” concluded in Beijing by the Chinese and North Korean governments 
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on May 4, 1951 (Yang 2002, 604-612).
The two countries clearly defined the wartime railroad management plan and 
the system of organization. According to the agreement, a North Korean railroad 
military management department was officially established in Anju in July 
1951. Liu Jing from China was appointed the director and political commissar, 
and Kim Hwang Il and Kim Hwang Tak from North Korea were appointed the 
deputy directors in charge of railroad transportation management. The railroad 
management department had five branches (Huichon, Chongju, Sinsongchon, 
Pyongyang, and Kowon) and approximately 12,000 Chinese were mobilized. In 
addition, the Front Railroad Transportation Headquarters was also organized in 
Anju, in November 1951, to oversee railroad repairs and military defensive tasks. 
During this time, the railroad corps increased to four divisions, and about 52,000 
Chinese were sent to North Korea as members of the Chinese labor service corps 
(ibid., 612).
North Korea and China attempted to overcome railroad destruction through 
the utilization of manpower on a large scale, recruiting local inhabitants and the 
Chinese labor service corps, to counter the overwhelming power of the machines 
of the USAF. According to Hong Xuezhi, a deputy commander of the Chinese 
military forces, on average 244 laborers per kilometer were working on railroad 
restoration in “the triangular zone” of Sinanju, Sopo and Kaechon railroads, 
which was a major rail center in North Korea. In addition, military supplies 
were transported by truck, wagons, and rickshaws in damaged sections where 
a train could not pass. A large number of Chinese labor service corps and local 
inhabitants played an essential role in transporting mass supplies from one train 
to another (Hong 2008, 368-369).
The vivid testimony of Park Jin Hong, a South Korean who was mobilized 
for labor in a doha jakeopdae (river-crossing labor unit) as a prisoner of war, 
described the daily lives of the North Korean inhabitants who lived with reversed 
nights and days. The doha jakeopdae was a working group that transshipped 
cargoes transported by one train to another across a river every night using a log 
bridge installed beside the railroad bridge near a prison camp. According to Park, 
the residents of the North Korean farming village where he was staying slept in 
the daytime and worked outside at night. The village was crowded with many 
people only at night:
A locomotive and a freight train arrived in the middle of the night. The railroad 
bridge was destroyed so that a train could not pass. The log bridge was also too weak 
for an engine locomotive to pass. That was why we were needed. We had to work on 
the loading and unloading only by hand. We transshipped the cargoes in a cart, and 
five-to-six people pushed the cart across the log bridge to the other side. When we 
arrived at the other side, we transshipped cargoes to a freight train on standby. Then, 
we pushed the freight train to the tunnel up to 300 meters away. We worked at night 
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and slept in the daytime and repeated this work every day (J.H. Park 2001, 105).
Park said that there were rails on the log bridge during the period of their labor, 
but the rails were disassembled to avoid bombing in the daytime. The USAF 
dropped bombs in this area almost every day, but they attacked only railroad 
bridges and not log bridges. Park Jin Hong said that the North Korean troops 
fired at the bombers with anti-aircraft guns, but no bombers had ever been shot 
down. 
In this way, the intensive interdiction policy of the USAF represented by 
Operation Strangle and Operation Saturate was essentially a battle between 
machines and humans. As the front became fixed and the conflict settled into 
fierce trench warfare, reminiscent of World War I, a continuing stream of 
supplies from the rear area became an issue impacting success or failure. In this 
situation, the UN forces received troops, supplies and weapons from the rear 
area of South Korea and Japan without serious difficulty, whereas the Chinese 
and North Korean military forces had to fight fierce battles throughout the rear 
area due to the USAF bombing. The inhabitants of the rear area were also unable 
to live ordinary lives. In particular, the fact that a large number of them had to 
live with reversed nights and days in order to carry on with nighttime railroad 
restoration and other kinds of labor heavily affected their daily lives. The people 
in North Korea had to face the fear of death every day during the two-year 
armistice negotiations and had to endure abnormal daily lives, including living 
underground and working through the night, until a truce was signed.
Conclusion
After the war, Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, declared that the war 
effort had been a success. Regardless of the historical truth, the North Korean 
government contended that the war had been started by the United States and 
South Korea when they launched a preemptive attack on the North on June 25, 
1950. They also contended that North Korea, which was a newborn and weak 
Asian nation, bravely fought off the United States, the most powerful nation in 
the world fresh from its victory in World War II.
However, the harsh reality experienced by the people in North Korea 
after the war ended made it difficult to define themselves as the victor. 
According to a document issued by the Soviet Union immediately after the 
war, approximately 282,000 civilians had been killed by “air strikes” alone—an 
average of approximately 250 civilians per day (KIMH 2002, 36). When the war 
ended, in 1953, the cities and villages of North Korea were completely ruined. As 
mentioned above, when the investigation group of WIDF visited Pyongyang in 
1951 they were unable to find any house walls or ceilings intact. General William 
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Dean, commander of the U.S. 24th division, who was taken prisoner during the 
early days of the war and spent a great part of the war in North Korea, wrote in 
his memoirs: “Most of the towns were just rubble or snowy open spaces, where 
buildings had been... The little towns, once full of people, were unoccupied shells” 
(Dean 1954, 272-275). The sweeping destruction of civilian areas in North Korea 
due to air strikes had been unquestionably extensive.
Since the end of the war the South Korean and U.S. governments have 
absolutely rejected the point of view that regards North Korea as a victim. In its 
2010 final report the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established by the 
South Korean government in 2005, evaluated South Korean and North Korean 
civilian sacrifices due to USAF air strikes: 
Regarding the considerable number of lives sacrificed due to the actions of the U.S. 
armed forces, the Korea Truth and Reconciliation Commission has decided that 
the Republic of Korea was under general attack at the time of the Korean War and 
military requirements took precedence over compliance with civilian protection 
criteria, given that it was an urgent matter of life and death for the nation. Thus, we 
defined most of the civilian sacrifices as “collateral damage.” In other words, it is sad 
that civilians were sacrificed by the U.S. armed forces, but they were unavoidable 
sacrifices (TRC 2010, 3). 
Shockingly, the Korean government still justifies the sacrifices of South Korean 
and North Korean civilians due to the USAF bombings by using the term 
“collateral damage.” This perspective is embedded in South Korean society and 
it is still hard for South Koreans to hold the view that North Korean civilian 
casualties were war victims.
Now that the Cold War has ended we need to pay attention to the identity 
of North Korea, which was not only an attacker during the war but also one 
of its supreme victims. In particular, we need to understand the deep hatred, 
pain, and fear that North Koreans harbor, formed as a result of experiencing 
three years of bombardment. Edgar Snow, the renown American journalist who 
had witnessed the Japanese aerial bombing of Chongqing in 1939, said that air 
strikes “arouse a completely personal hate that no one can really understand” 
(Lindqvist 2001, 75). We need to understand the daily lives of North Koreans 
who endured underground living with reversed days and nights throughout the 
war and try to comprehend their “completely personal hate” toward those who 
caused their suffering. The underground space, which was so dark and small for 
the North Korean civilians, formed the mother’s womb that gave birth to a people 
completely different from who they had been before the war. The basis of peace 
and reconciliation in East Asia should be sought by looking squarely at this truth.
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Notes
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant 
funded by the Korean Government (MEST) (NRF-2010-361-A00017).
1. Of course, it’s very hard to say that the lives of South Koreans were peaceful during 
the early months of the Korean War (June-September 1950). South Koreans also suffered 
from horrible massacres and indiscriminate aerial bombing. See T. Kim 2012a.
2. In this article the Romanization of Korean generally follows these rules: The Revised 
Romanization of Korean (2000), the official system in South Korea, is used for general 
terms and document/book titles, and for place names in South Korea. For names of cities/
locations in North Korea, the official North Korean system is used to facilitate location 
of sites on current maps. For personal names the South Korean system is used unless the 
Romanized names are cited in documents or are widely accepted spellings (e.g., Kim Il 
Sung).
3.  WIDF was a huge, global organization that boasted 135 million members in 62 
countries in October 1951, and the articles of the federation suggested the extermination of 
fascism and the establishment of permanent peace (Joseon Jung’ang Tongsinsa 1952, 203).
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